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ABSTRACT : The remarkable economic success of the US in the late 1990s led 
many economists to talk about a ‘New Economy’, according to which technological 
advances had brought on a higher sustained level of productivity growth that allowed 
faster economic growth with less inflation, and very low unemployment. But given 
the events since 2000-the long, steep stock market downturn, the falloff in business 
investment and the subsequent recession-many questions arose based on whether 
anything in the New Economy view is valid. This essay provides a detailed overview 
of the main issues, many of them closely linked to the rise of the Internet. 
 
Keywords: New Economy, Productivity Growth, Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT). 
 
ÖZET : Birleik Devletlerin, 1990’ların sonlarındaki olaanüstü ekonomik baarısı 
pek çok ekonomisti ‘Yeni Ekonomi’ ile ilgili mülahazalara sevketmitir. ‘Yeni 
Ekonomi’ anlayıına göre, teknolojik gelimeler, yüksek oranlı sürdürülebilir 
üretkenlik artıına, bu da çok düük isizlik ve daha az enflasyonun elik ettii daha 
hızlı bir ekonomik büyümeye neden olmutur. Fakat, 2000’den bu yana devam eden 
gelimeler-borsada uzun ve derin baaaı iniler, iletmelerin yatırımlarındaki 
azalılar ve bunları takip eden durgunluk- Yeni Ekonomi görüünün hala geçerli 
olup olmadıı hakkında birçok soruyu gündeme getirmitir. Bu makale, pekçou 
internetin yükselii ile sıkı sıkıya balantılı Yeni Ekonominin temel konularını 
detaylı bir biçimde gözden geçirmektedir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeni Ekonomi, Üretkenlik Büyümesi, Enformasyon ve 
Komünikasyon Teknolojisi (EKT). 
 
I. Introduction 
“Productivity isn’t everything, but in the long run it is almost everything. A country’s 
ability to improve its standard of living over time depends almost entirely on its 
ability to raise its output per worker…Yet overall our economy has done far worse 
over the past generation than anyone would have predicted. We have entered an era 
in which economic progress has become a doubtful thing. Many Americans feel that 
they live worse than their parents; even more fear that their children will be worse 
off than themselves” (Krugman, 1998:2-11).  
 
                                                 
∗
 The title of Paul Krugman (1998), The Age of Diminished Expectations: U.S. Economic Policy in the 
1990s. Third Edition. The MIT Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
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In the late 1990s, many economists and policymakers agreed that there have been 
fundamental changes in the US economy, of which remarkable economic 
performance has been the subject of so much excited comment and analysis (see, for 
example, Gordon, 2002 and 2000; Temple, 2002; Baily, 2001; DeLong and 
Summers, 2001; Claussen and Staehr, 2001). The surprising economic performance, 
including low unemployment and accelerated productivity growth with low inflation, 
is the key driver of the New Economy in the US. The starting point for the New 
Economy proponents is that the development, adoption and the use of new 
information and communication technology (ICT) have reshaped the economy in 
fundamental ways. Furthermore, many economies have become more integrated into 
the world economy with increased openness for trade, capital and intellectual ideas; 
a process partly following from improved information technologies. Although those 
who hold this view consider accelerated productivity growth fundamental to the late 
1990s boom, other forces are also at work. These include the earlier deregulation of 
key US industries, financial innovation and a more intense pressure of competition. 
Despite of this, the flood of Internet-related businesses and the spectacular rise in 
their stock valuations led some economists to redeem the New Economy as solely an 
Internet phenomenon (Formaini et al., 2003: 5; Baily, 2001: 2; DeLong et al., 2001: 
16-18).  
 
Baily (2001: 201-211) argues that the late 1990s boom may be attributed to the 
emergence and diffusion of new ICT, which led to improvement in the functioning of 
the labour market, increases in productivity growth directly, and improvement in 
functioning of product markets, and that, as a consequence, led to stronger economic 
performance. He further argues that although one may use the expression New 
Economy to describe this period, the term ‘New Economy’ may be viewed too 
broady, suggesting more fundamental and permanent changes than actually occurred. 
The term ‘Information Economy’, on the other hand, tends to be too narrow in 
explaining the set of interrelated forces bringing about change in the economy, which 
include increased globalisation, rapid development and the flood of Internet-related 
businesses. 
 
The New Economy discussion is in essence about two related issues: First, what are 
the factors behind the remarkable growth experience in the US? Second, what are the 
factors that have kept down inflation in an environment of rapid economic growth 
and falling unemployment? Also, the link between ICT and economic performance is 
worth being explored. The New Economy view has as its starting point the belief that 
two broady autonomous, but mutually reinforcing, trends are changing the economy 
in a fundamental way. The emergence and diffusion of ICT has strong impact on the 
labour market and product market, leading to increases in productivity due to an 
exogenous surge in innovation and capability in the high-tech sector. The rapid 
growth and dynamism of the high-tech sector is exogenous for it is indeed changing 
traditional industries, but is also being driven by the demand from traditional 
industries. The idea behind the change in the functioning of the labour market is that, 
for example, Internet job sites represent a more efficient mechanism for matching 
workers and jobs than what has been available before. Along with the tight labour 
market, high-pressure economy, and low unemployment rate of the late 1990s may 
be seen as a product of the accelerated productivity that is largely driven by the 
technological advances in data processing and data communications. 
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The arrival of the new economy had also been accompanied by a very large increase 
in the value of corporate equities, a rapid rate of increase in consumption and a very 
large increase in the inflow of capital to the US (Baily, 2001 : 239). Through 1999, 
the performance of the US stock market was extraordinary, as there was a massive 
boom (Temple, 2002 : 22-25). Price-earning ratios for the aggregate US market were 
at the highest levels ever observed in the Twentieth Century. For a comparison, for 
example, the market value was a mere $7.4 trillion in January of 1996, and the 
market value of publicly held corporate stock reached $17.5 trillion, in December 
1999, hit a monthly peak in August of 2000 at $18.9 trillion, and had fallen to $15.5 
trillion in April of 2001 (Baily, 2001 : 239). The most dramatic and glamorous 
aspect of the boom was the rise of the internet companies and dotcoms, many of 
which exploited huge gains for their founders almost overnight, and gave plenty of 
freedom to those who challenged that the old economic rules were being rewritten, 
and the old economy firms were doomed (Formaini et al., 2003: 8; Temple, 2002: 
2). The grossly overvalued NASDAQ collapsed, and the broad stock market has 
fallen by about 30 per cent. As the decline in the stock market has created a feeling 
of vertigo in many investors, in November 2002 the National Bureau of Economic 
Research announced that the US economy had slipped into a recession in March 
2001 (Baily, 2001: 239; DeLong et al., 2001: 25-27; Temple, 2002: 2). This 
announcement provided official confirmation that the heady days of the 1990s were 
over. The collapse of the NASDAQ had already taken the shine off the optimism 
surrounding the New Economy. In addition, the terrorist attacks of the World Trade 
Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001 have 
created a long-term disruption and increased the uncertainty of the economic outlook 
(DeLong et al., 2001: 11). The US expansion, which came to an end in 2001, had 
lasted exactly five years, one of the longest unbroken expansions ever recorded by an 
industrial country. For one time, one may have heard arguments that the business 
cycle was dead in the New Economy, now it is feared that the economy is stuck in an 
extended period of stagnation with little hope of speedy recovery (Formaini et al., 
2003: 6-7). There is one dimension along that the New Economy is a source of 
macroeconomic danger. The decade in the past century, which saw the fastest 
productivity growth and the greatest degree of structural change was the 1920s, and 
the booming 1920s were followed by the disastrous 1930s. Indeed, there was no 
necessary reason that a decade as good as the 1920s had to be followed by the Great 
Depression (DeLong et al., 2001 : 29-30).  
 
Thus, the remarkable performance of the US economy in the 1990s has been much 
discussed. The increase in the rate of productivity growth in the second half of the 
1990s has been one of the most important factors at work in driving faster GDP 
growth, lower inflation, lower unemployment, faster real wage growth, an inflow of 
capital, budget surpluses, and improved living standards. Possible economic 
consequences of these events may have been important beyond the US. Since new 
technologies are easily transferred across national borders, the economic dynamism 
of the US might rapidly spread outwards to the developed and developing countries. 
Nevertheless, Temple (2002: 2) suggests that popular commentators have tended to 
imply that the US experience is unique, and have used it to criticise the apparent lack 
of progress in other countries, especially those of Europe. Governments outside the 
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US are routinely castigated for presiding over sluggish economies that are over-
regulated and slow to innovate.  
 
This essay attempts to review the principal reasons and possible consequences of the 
New Economy in the US. The essay is set out as follows. Following this 
introduction, Section II reviews analyses of the New Economy paradigm. Section III 
investigates the accelerated productivity growth and the accompanying boom in 
equipment investment. Section IV examines the combination of low inflation and 
falling unemployment during the second half of the 1990s. Finally, Section V 
concludes. 
 
II. What is The New Economy? 
“World War II veterans came home to an economy that doubled its productivity over 
the next 25 years; as a result they found themselves achieving living standards their 
parents had never imagined. Vietnam veterans came home to an economy that raised 
its productivity less than 10 percent in 15 years; as a result, they found themselves 
living no better-and in many cases worse-than their parents” (Krugman, 1998 : 11).  
 
The performance of the US economy after World War II was very strong with rapid 
growth, relatively low employment, and moderate inflation. Compared with the 
problems of war and the turmoil of the depression, a new, stronger, and more stable 
economy emerged. After 1973, economic performance deteriorated, and chronic 
problems with inflation, unemployment, and slower growth arose (Krugman, 1998: 
11). The first two rows of Table 1 exhibit this contrast. Real GDP growth and real 
GDP per capita growth dropped by nearly a third after 1973. Average unemployment 
rose by nearly 40 per cent and average core inflation more than doubled. As can be 
seen in Table 2, over the 1990s, as a whole, productivity growth was unremarkable 
by the standards of 1980s. The case for the importance of the New Economy rests on 
the second half of the decade, when the boom continued for much longer than most 
observers, and growth rates in excess of 4% a year were repeatedly recorded (Baily, 
2001: 203; Temple, 2002 : 6). Growth rates for the period from the fourth quarter of 
1995 until the fourth quarter of 2001, with growth rates for two earlier periods, 
essentially the 1950s and 1960s, and the period of the productivity slowdown that 
began in the early 1970s. It can be seen that in the New Economy period, which is 
the second half of the 1990s, the productivity growth, although better than in the late 
1970s and early 1990s, has not yet achieved the heights of the early 1960s. As can be 
seen in Table 1, the period 1990 to 2000, as a whole, looks pretty good compared to 
the 1973-1990 period in terms of average core inflation and average unemployment. 
Both variables improved greatly, and compare well with the golden years before 
1973. Nevertheless, the story does not seem so clear in terms of growth. Growth for 
the whole decade was ahead of the slow growth period after 1973, but slower than in 
the 1960s. In fact, all of the growth acceleration is concentrated in the second half of 
the decade. The five years after 1995, i.e. the New Economy period, are a 
remarkable but very short period of rapid growth, low unemployment, and low 
inflation.   
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Table 1. Indicators of Macroeconomic Performance 
 
Period 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Real GDP per 
Capita Growth 
Average 
Unemployment 
Average Core 
Inflation* 
1959-1973 4.2 2.9 4.9 2.7 
1973-1990 2.9 1.0 7.0 5.9 
1990-2000 3.2 2.2 5.6 2.4 
1990-1995 2.4 1.3 6.6 3.0 
1995-2000 4.1 3.2 4.6 1.7 
*
 Chain price index for personal consumption expenditure, excluding food and energy.  
Source: Baily (2001, Table 1). 
 
Table 2. US Growth Rates 1950-2001 
Period Real GDP Growth Productivity Growth 
1950:2-1972:2 3.9% 2.7% 
1972:2-1995:4 2.9% 1.4% 
1995:4-2001:4 3.5% 2.4% 
Source: Temple (2002, Table 1). 
 
Gordon (1998) suggests that the American economy of the mid-1990s has been a 
source of envy for the world and of puzzlement for macroeconomics. What is the 
New Economy? Is the New Economy paradigm simply Pollyanna economics? Or is 
it rooted in reality? Many use the term New Economy to refer to events expected to 
result in always-rising corporate revenues, higher sustainable corporate valuations 
and end of the business cycles (Formaini et al., 2003: 5). Baily (2001: 204) argues 
that although evaluating the performance of the stock market tends to be very 
sensitive to starting and ending points, one of the most remarkable signs of the New 
Economy has probably been the strong performance of the US stock market. 
However, Formaini et al. (2003: 5) argue that the New Economy has not produced 
ever-increasing stock prices or tamed business cycles. The US Department of 
Commerce (1998) defines the New Economy as an economy in which ICT and 
related investment drive higher rates of productivity growth. The new technologies 
have remarkably influenced productivity in the whole economy as ICT are adopted 
in many sectors. ICT are believed to increase the efficiency of labour and capital and 
thereby influence productivity directly. Furthermore, the new technologies are likely 
to be embodied in equipment, increasing the profitability of investment. Higher 
investment might also add to productivity gains. There has been heightened 
competition in an increasingly deregulated economy facing strong international 
competition. ICT innovation is driven by the demand for improved technologies in 
the using industries. It is argued that the policy environment in the 1990s in the US 
contributed to the creation of the right environment for growth and innovation 
(DeLong et al., 2001: 38). Accordingly, policies to maintain domestic competition 
and increase international competition have been stressed, and funds have been 
provided to support basic research and education. Most importantly, the mix of 
monetary and fiscal policy has lowered interest rates and encouraged investment 
(Baily, 2001: 210). According to DeLong et al. (2001 : 15), the New Economy 
employs technology to substantively alter production or consumption processes or 
both. The term became popular in considering the remarkable economic performance 
of the US in the 1990s, and especially the 1995-2000. Council of Economic 
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Advisors’ The Economic Report of the President (January 2001: 23) defines the New 
Economy as the extraordinary gains in performance, including rapid productivity 
growth, rising incomes, low unemployment, and moderate inflation, that have 
resulted from this combination of mutually reinforcing advances in technologies, 
business practices, and economic policies. 
 
Some economists argue that the productivity revival may come from cyclical effects 
and from the surge in productivity growth within the computer sector (Gordon, 
2000). Cyclical dynamics were explored by Gordon (2000) who argued that the huge 
rate of decline in computer prices of the post-1995 cannot continue indefinitely, and 
there will inevitably be diminishing returns to investment in ICT capital. Further, 
Gordon (2000) examined the impact of ICT on the increase in productivity growth 
and found that it had only a minor impact on the increase in productivity growth in 
the economy outside the computer producing industries. Oliner et al. (2000) found 
that the increased use of ICT contributed to approximately three fourth of the 
increase in labour productivity. The Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) (2001) 
estimated that an important share of the uptake in multifactor productivity is due to 
increased productivity in sectors other than the computer industry. Excitement over 
new technology’s potential for lowering expenses, boosting profits and expanding 
market share sometimes leads analysts and investors to believe the good times will 
never end. For example, in the midst of the 1990s boom, Dornbusch (1998) once 
proclaimed that the remarkable expansion would run forever, and the US economy 
would never see a recession for years to come. Of course, less than three years later 
the expansion did end. Hence, business cycles are not dead and never will be. 
Nevertheless, there are still further reasons for seeing the successful macroeconomic 
performance of the US economy in the 1990s as special. Over the last decade, 
inflation in the US has been surprisingly low and stable. As measured by the deflator 
for personal consumption expenditure, inflation averaged 2.5% in the 1990s as a 
whole, compared to an average of around 5% in the 1980s, and more than 6% in the 
1970s (Temple, 2002: 6). The inflation performance is the most remarkable sign 
taking into account the real economic developments. The expansion is the longest in 
history, and by April 2000, the unemployment rate had steadily fallen to just 3.9%, a 
thirty-year low (Claussen et al., 2001: 2). Still, even more remarkably, despite this 
very low rate of unemployment, inflation has remained subdued. These 
developments are difficult to reconcile with the standard perception that, ceteris 
paribus, low unemployment and accelerated growth is associated with high inflation. 
Overall, the economy displayed much lower volatility in growth, unemployment and 
inflation than in previous decades, leading some to hail the death of the business 
cycle (Formaini et al., 2003: 5; Temple, 2002: 20). The evidence for a New 
Economy was often closely linked to the increasingly high profile of the Internet. 
Considerable excitement surrounded the spectacular rise of the internet companies 
and dotcoms. 
  
The term ‘New Economy’ refers to a golden, or at least gilded, age in the late 1990s 
that was driven by optimism about the financial prospects for information 
technology. There were three back-to-back investment shocks during this period: 
telecommunications deregulation in 1996, the “year 2K” problem in 1998-1999, and 
the “dot.com” boom in 1999-2000. These events stimulated significant investment in 
The New Economy Macroeconomics : The Late “Golden Age of Diminished … 
 
 
115
information technology in a number of industries, leading to a very rapid expansion 
of IT-producing industries (Varian, 2001: 65).  
 
The increase in productivity growth in the late 1990s is often attributed to the 
investment in ICT, mostly in computers, during the first half of that decade (see, for 
example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Temple, 2002). The rise in internet stock 
valuations between 1998 and 2000 may be considered one of the most remarkable 
asset pricing phenomena of our time. Temple (2002: 22-25) argues that there does 
not, however, exist straightforward relationship between the productivity growth of 
the late 1990s and the rise of the internet; for even at its peak the internet-related 
sector accounted for a relatively low share of total US stock market capitalisation. 
Most internet shares were trading on very large multiples of earnings, suggesting that 
relatively few internet companies were making a noticeable contribution to growth in 
productivity and output. 
 
Overall, it is important to recognise the fact that the US economy in the New 
Economy era looks rather different to that of the 1970s and 1980s. The 
unprecedented length of the great expansion may be explained by the continued 
strength of productivity growth, soaring equipment investment, and the stability of 
inflation despite declining unemployment. Further, a good understanding of the 
sources of productivity growth is essential in exploring whether or not rapid growth 
is sustainable. 
 
III. Accelerated Productivity Growth 
The rapid rate of the US economic growth achieved after World War II was largely 
driven by productivity growth close to 3 per cent a year, whilst the decelerated 
growth after 1973 was associated with a sharp slowdown in productivity to 1.4 per 
cent per annum. Likewise, the strong growth of the US economy during the second 
half of the 1990s may be linked to a recovery of productivity growth (Baily, 2001: 
205). Temple (2002: 9) argues that the remarkable economic expansion of the 1990s 
in the US looks much like the 1970s in reverse. The 1970s were notable for 
substantial adverse supply shocks, the 1990s for their absence. The 1970s saw a 
steep fall in stock market capitalisation relative to GDP, an unprecedented decline in 
the rate of productivity growth, rising unemployment and unstable inflation, which is 
the reverse of the 1990s experience on all accounts. The case for seeing the New 
Economy as a substantial and important development relies upon the unexpected 
acceleration of productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s. The productivity 
acceleration sustained the economic expansion for an unusually long time, raised real 
wages, prompted the stock market boom, and might also account for a temporary 
change in the conventional trade-off between inflation and unemployment. In 
general, studies on the New Economy mainly concentrate upon the productivity 
acceleration, which tends to be significantly crucial for economic growth and as a 
consequence, the standard of living, and also increases in productivity is sustainable 
unlike the stock market boom.  
 
Table 3 reports four alternative estimates of the extent and sources of productivity 
acceleration, using estimates from Oliner et al. (2000), Gordon (2000), Jorgenson 
and Stiroh (2000), and CEA (2001). All four estimates exhibit a large increase in 
labour productivity growth in the non-farm business sector, reflecting substantial 
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improvements of labour productivity acceleration in the second half of the 1990s. All 
four estimates provide evidence of the remarkably rapid accumulation of ICT capital 
over this period, leading to acceleration in the rate of labour productivity growth, 
whereas apparent deceleration in the rate of accumulation of other capital may 
partially offset the labour productivity contribution from the ICT capital boom. 
Nevertheless, increases in overall MFP are estimated to contribute half or more of 
the total productivity acceleration. The accelerated rate of MFP growth, shown in the 
antepenultimate row, is partitioned into the production of computer hardware sector, 
shown in the penultimate line and the rate of MFP growth in the broad economy that 
is the part of the economy not involved directly in computer production. The latter is 
shown in the final row. It is apparent that computer sector productivity and other NF 
productivity contribute heavily to the total MFP growth. Thus, rapid productivity 
growth seems to be driven by the high-tech sector, and more specifically, a 
combination of productivity gains in computer production and increased investment 
in computing. The surge of productivity within the high-tech sector itself drove a 
large fraction of the productivity growth.  
 
Baily (2001) notes that the US appears to be a major producer of the high-tech 
products and that the pace of technical innovation may explain why the US grew so 
rapidly in the late 1990s. Oliner et al. (2000) point out that investment in computers 
and related hardware equipment in the US increased more than fourfold between 
1995-1999. Despite Gordon’s (1999 and 2000) criticisms, these productivity gains 
led to the price of computers declining at an even faster rate, and prompted much 
wider use of computers. Perhaps, almost world-wide use of the Internet, allowing to 
access all distributed global database of information, prompts growth in computer 
investment. The economic salience of the high-tech sector tends to rise over time. 
Oliner et al. (2000) suggest that while during the 1980s the high-tech capital, 
including computer hardware, software, and telecommunications equipment, 
accounted for 3.3 per cent of the income earned in the economy, and contributed 0.5 
per cent per year to economic growth, by the late 1990s, the high-tech capital 
accounted for 7.0 per cent of income earned in the economy and contributed 1.4 per 
cent per year to economic growth. 
 
Table 3. Decomposition of the Productivity Growth 
 Oliner-
Sichel Gordon 
Jorgenson-
Stiroh CEA 
Labour Productivity 
Non-farm Business (NF) 1.38 1.53 1.01 1.63 
Cyclical Effect n.a. 0.30 n.a. 0.04 
ICT Capital 0.70 0.70 0.44 0.62 
Other Capital -0.26 -0.26 0.09 -0.23 
Measurement Effects n.a. 0.15 n.a. n.a. 
Labour Quality 0.04 0.04 -0.23 0.00 
Total Multifactor 
Productivity (MFP) 0.90 0.60 0.71 1.19 
Computer Sector MFP 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.18 
Other NF MFP 0.59 0.29 0.40 1.00 
Notes: Annual percentage rates of growth. Compares 1995-2000 with 1973-1995. Includes consumer 
durables and farm sector. 
Source: Baily (2001, Table 2) was extracted from Oliner et al (2000); Gordon (2000); Jorgenson et al 
(2000); and CEA (2001).  
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As have already been mentioned in the preceding sections, the rapid growth of the 
high-tech sector is endogenous. While it leads the ‘Old Economy’ companies to 
change, it is also being driven by the demand from the conventional industries. The 
fact is that conventional industries, such as the manufacturing industry in the US, 
may be the biggest user of the high-tech capital goods. Whilst some manufacturing 
jobs may disappear, sector output remains steady (Formaini et al., 2003: 8). Some 
economists emphasise possible cyclical effects that may be responsible for the recent 
acceleration in productivity expansion (Baily, 2001: 216; DeLong, 2001: 28; 
Temple, 2002: 14). A euphoric boom is a period during which people stop thinking 
as intensely about problems of macroeconomic management and the business cycle. 
Ironically, it is precisely during euphoria that counter-cyclical policy becomes less 
important. But it is in the aftermath of euphoria that counter-cyclical policy becomes 
more important than at any other time. For example, nobody in Japan in the late 
1980s paid any attention to problems of business cycle management. Few in Japan in 
the early 1990s paid sufficient attention to the business cycle. Consequently, the 
Japanese economy as well as the world economy today suffers from that lapse 
(DeLong, 2001: 28-30). Thus, the largest short-run impact of the New Economy may 
be that it increases the stakes at risk in macroeconomic management. Nobody doubts 
that cyclical effects have played a significant role, in particular given the steep fall in 
unemployment. The magnitude of the required adjustments is more controversial, 
partly because trend/cycle decompositions are inherently difficult, and partly because 
the 1990s expansion was one of the longest on record. The length of the expansion 
suggests that much of the productivity growth should be sustainable. 
 
To recognise the rapid expansion in productivity growth was undoubtedly important. 
Otherwise, the 1990s boom might easily have been perceived as unsustainable, and 
policymakers would have been wary of the economy overheating. Yet, productivity 
growth does not in itself explain why inflation remained low even when the 
unemployment rate fell below most estimates of the natural rate. Hence, the New 
Economy paradigm relies not only upon rapid productivity expansion, but also on 
the remarkable behaviour of inflation and unemployment, and a level of overall 
economic stability not seen since the 1960s. 
 
IV. Low Inflation-Low Unemployment Puzzle 
One of the most intriguing features of the New Economy is why the inflation rate fell 
so low and stayed stable in the 1990s, despite the unemployment rate falling to a 
level that seemed to make pushing up inflation inevitable. The 1990s pose something 
of challenge to adherents of the natural rate hypothesis even though not an 
insurmountable one.  
 
One potential explanation is that a series of positive supply shocks decelerated 
inflation, offsetting the inflationary effect of low unemployment. Gordon (1998) 
mentions that declining energy prices through 1998, a sharp decline in the rate of 
increase of health care costs, food and computer prices helped hold down unit costs. 
As energy and health care prices moved up again in 1999 and 2000, there was some 
upward movement in wage and price inflation. Nevertheless, supply shocks 
explanation cannot account for the maintenance of low inflation beyond 1998, given 
the slowdown in the appreciation of the exchange rate, and rising energy prices. 
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Studies on the estimation of Phillips curve in the US question whether there exists 
any systematic relationship between unemployment and inflation. Sims (1999) and 
Stock (1998) suggest that the unemployment rate seems to be a poor predictor of 
inflation. Stock (1998) argues that the key puzzle is why unemployment has ceased 
to have much predictive power for inflation, even while other indices of real activity, 
such as capacity utilisation and housing starts, continue to play a useful forecasting 
role. Similarly, Stock and Watson (1999) argue that utilisation of installed 
production capacity seems to be a better indicator of inflationary pressure than 
measures of unemployment. Katz and Krueger (1999) point out that the decline in 
unemployment in the 1990s was associated with a marked shift in the relationship 
between unemployment and vacancies. Temporary help agencies have accounted for 
an increasing share of employment, albeit from a very low base, a development that 
may allow workers and vacancies to be matched more efficiently. Thus, inflation 
remained stable at such low unemployment rates is that low unemployment was no 
longer signalling the same tightness in the labour or product markets as in previous 
periods. These considerations seem to be consistent with a further stylised fact of the 
New Economy, namely that there has been a particularly steep decline in short-term 
unemployment, so that the composition of unemployment duration has shifted 
towards long-term spells.  
 
Ball and Tchiadze (2002) stress that monetary policy implementations under Alan 
Greenspan management was coincided with the awareness of a decline in the natural 
rate of unemployment that fell through 1994. This element of the available evidence 
is indirect, however. The overall arguments are vulnerable to a conventional 
criticism of the natural rate hypothesis, namely that candidate explanations for 
movements of the natural rate sometimes look to much like ex-post rationalisations. 
From this point of view, a potentially more satisfactory explanation of the 1990s 
record is to link the joint behaviour of unemployment and inflation to the increase in 
productivity growth. To the extent that workers were initially unaware of the 
increase, wage demands may have lagged behind productivity growth, implying that 
inflation could remain stable even while unemployment fell below previous estimates 
of the natural rate. Strong productivity growth and favourable price shocks allowed 
the monetary authorities to steer inflation lower in the 1990s while maintaining 
strong demand in the economy. To sum up, the inflation record of the 1990s in the 
US may be explained by a series of favourable supply shocks, a decline in the natural 
rate, unprecedented productivity expansion, or more likely, some combination of all 
three.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Many economists and some observers agreed that faster technical progress in ICT 
production, operating in an environment of increased globalisation, intense 
competition, and sound monetary and fiscal policies prompted improved economic 
performance in the late 1990s in the US. The recent rapid productivity expansion can 
be attributed to rapid advances in ICT production, which has a direct effect on 
aggregate productivity, also stimulated greater investments in ICT products, as the 
relative price of computing power has fallen at an even faster rate. The combined 
effect of these events helped sustain the 1990s boom for an unusually long time.  
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It seems that the reasons for the stability of inflation and for the greater overall 
stability, which was such a marked feature of the US economy in the 1990s, have not 
been discovered thoroughly yet. Finding a reasonable answer to the question of why 
unemployment rate remained low and stable without pushing up inflation in an 
environment with overall economic stability involves the problem that is to 
discriminate between many competing explanations, some of which are based upon 
movements in a variable that is not directly observed, namely the natural rate of 
unemployment.   
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